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INDIAN CONSENT TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Richard B. Collins*

Consent of the governed is a fundamental tenet of democratic constitutionalism. Have American Indian people consented to American government? In liberal political theory, consent is manifested through the
franchise and representatives chosen by voters acting individually.' But Indian people could not be fitted into this constitutional scheme until relatively
recently, and even now their circumstances raise unique questions about
consent.
The principle of consent of the governed has an important connection
to federal Indian law. Traditional Indian law theory is based upon treaties
between Indian nations and the United States. 2 The treaties evidence Indian
consent and proclaim promises of the United States, consent by and
promises to tribes as groups rather than Indians as individuals. The commitments in Indian treaties are the claimed source of the fundamental doctrines3
of federal Indian law, the federal trust relationship with tribes and Indians,
protects tribes' exclusive authority
and the Indian sovereignty doctrine that
4
over their members in Indian 'country.
This theory is familiar, and so are its limitations. The treaties did not
provide explicitly for either retained tribal sovereignty or federal trust responsibility. While inferring retained sovereignty was a reasonable construction of some treaties, the circumstances of other treaty negotiations
make it doubtful that the parties contemplated continuing tribal sovereignty. 5 Many treaty negotiations also reveal substantial coercion of the tri* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I am grateful for advice and comments of my colleagues, David Getches, Charles Wilkinson, and Kevin Reitz, and for the research
assistance of Rick Stone.
1. See M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP viixiv (1970); Whelan, Prologue Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem 24-26, in LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY: NOMOS XXV (1983).
2. See C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 120 (1987); F. COHEN,

HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 33 (1941 ed. & 1971, 1986 reprints); MARGOLD, Introduction, in id. at VIII-XIII; Rice, The Position of the American Indian in the Law of the United States,
16 J. COMp. LEG. 78, 80-81 (1934).
3. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220-28 (1982 ed.) (Trust doctrine is
"one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law." Id. at 221.).
4. See id. at 229-61; F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 122 (sovereignty doctrine is "[p]erhaps the
most basic principle of all Indian law").
5. See infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text. Anachronistically, one can improve the connection between treaty promises and the federal trust and tribal sovereignty doctrines by relying on
modem contract theories such as adhesion, unconscionability, and implied covenants of good faith
and fair dealing. See E. FARNswORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.26-4.28, at 293-318, § 7.17, at 526-28
(1982). These doctrines were connected to federal Indian law in Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial
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bal 1arty, impairing the justness of Indian consent. Further, why should
treaty principles be extended to the many situations in Indian law where no
treaty is involved? Why, for example, is sovereignty reserved to non-treaty
tribes residing on executive order reservations? And why should federal
statutes applied to Indians be construed in their favor? This Article responds to these questions and to related issues about the constitutional status
of Indian nations and their members.
The claimed origin of Indian law doctrine in treaty promises is accurate, but not on the basis of the treaties alone. They do not adequately support the generality of the sovereignty doctrine applied to all tribes and
reservations, nor do they sustain or define much of the federal trust responsibility. The connection between treaties and the general doctrines depends on
the constitutional principle that power should be based on consent of the
6
governed.
The original understanding was that the United States would deal with
Indians as national groups. Their consent to American government was
sought and obtained collectively, not individually. After the Constitution
was adopted, many expressions of legislative and executive policy were based
on the premise that Indian
consent would and should be obtained by groups
7
rather than individually.
Judicial decisions reflect this basic understanding of the original constitutional status of tribal Indians. The Supreme Court looked to the agreements reached in the early peace treaties, when the tribes had significant
bargaining power, as the best measure of Indian consent. While sustaining
Congress' power to override treaties and to convert Indians into citizens, the
Court requires that departures from the original, collective basis for Indian
consent be clearly and unambiguously adopted by the national government. 8
The government has seldom met the Court's standard to terminate tribal
status. As a result, although Indians individually have the right to assume
the same constitutional status as other persons, they retain the choice of
separate status as tribal members as well.
The federal government continues to claim the constitutional power to
eliminate the separate constitutional status of Indian nations, 9 and the
Supreme Court has consistently agreed. 10 This has led some scholars to argue that the Constitution should be interpreted to protect tribes from federal
power, to erect a constitutional right of tribal sovereignty, immune from
congressional power, a sort of tenth amendment for tribes."
It is most unlikely that the Court will declare constitutional protection
Review of Indian Treaty Abrogations: "As Long As Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth'"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 617-18 (1975). However, even if these theories
are properly available, they would be hard pressed to explain the generality of the trust responsibility
and sovereignty doctrines. Compare the rules of international law on treaty interpretation, infra
notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 69-120 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 75-120 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 33-34, 39-40 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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of tribal sovereignty. Moreover, the issue is less significant than many assume because the constitutional structure powerfully protects tribal status
from hostile political majorities. 12 Tribal rights can be altered only by national legislation, not by the action of any state, nor by referendum. Congress has generally supported a policy of basing its actions on Indian
consent, and the Supreme Court's interpretations of legislation have been
grounded in the same fundamental premise. For these reasons, basic change
in tribal status is unlikely without tribal consent.
When the relationship of constitutional rights to tribes is examined in
its entirety, rights jurisprudence is a dubious foundation for tribal interests.
Individual rights concepts have often been at war with the interests of tribes
as governments, a conflict that continues. 13 Non-Indians in tribal territory
raise rights-based arguments against tribes' assertions of authority over
them. Federal power over tribes responds to these arguments, establishing
democratic legitimacy of tribal authority.
I.

A.

INDIANS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

The FederalProtectorateand Plenary Power.

The 1787 Constitution conceived of Indian tribes as outside of the body
politic it established. Tribal Indians were not even to be counted in apportioning representation and taxation among the states.1 4 Paramount power to
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes was delegated to the new federal
government, rather than to the states,1 5 at a time when federal responsibilities were largely international. Treaties previously made with Indian nations
were confirmed,1 6 and the United States made hundreds more treaties over
more than seventy years before deciding that Indian tribes were not sufficiently foreign to continue making treaties with them.17 Thereafter, Washington continued to deal with tribes on a government-to-government basis,
by means of agreements ratified by Congress.18 During the treaty period and
for some years thereafter, tribal Indians could not vote in state or federal
distinct
elections. 19 As the Supreme Court described it, they were "a people
20
communities."
political
"independent
comprising
from others"
12. See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.

13. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (no federal cause of action to
enforce civil rights against tribe); S.2747, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 11652 (1988) (bill
introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch to overturn or limit holding in Martinez).
14. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, ci. 3 (excluding "Indians not taxed"). See also ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (referring to tribal Indians as "not members of any of the States"); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2 (excluding "Indians not taxed"). The Convention labored mightily over the place
of slaves in the enumeration, settling on the notorious three-fifths provision. See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 103, 225, 248, 256,
259-61, 268-69, 274-76, 278, 281-82, 285-86, 309, 327, 409-13 (A. Koch ed. 1987). By contrast,
excluding tribal Indians was readily accepted without debate.
15. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557-59 (1832).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, 2 ("all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land").
17. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 58-107 (treaty making ended in 1871).
18. See infra note 54.
19. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 639-53.
20. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
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Although constitutionally separate, the tribes were within the boundaries of the United States and made subject to its national laws. While the
federal government dealt with tribes primarily through treaties and agreements, it also imposed statutes on Indians, a practice that grew throughout
the nineteenth century. 2 1 When challenged, federal legislative power over
22
tribes was consistently sustained; indeed, it was characterized as plenary.
Challenges by Indians increased when the government began to pursue policies designed to break up tribal societies and convert Indian people into
American citizens, legally like all others.2 3 Extraordinary power to manipu24
late tribal property was exercised and sustained against Indian objections.
Indian people resisted assimilation, and the federal government eventually receded from coercive policies. Indians were made citizens without requiring abandonment of tribal ties.2 5 Later the government deliberately set
about to support and revitalize tribal governments, and since 1960 policy has
been officially premised on Indian self-determination. 26 However, the27 government continues to claim discretionary power to set Indian policy.
21. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 108-43.
22. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 384-85 (1886); Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 567 (1883); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S.

(4 How.) 567, 572 (1846). The Court continues use of the word plenary. E.g., National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985); Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194, 203 (1975); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
23. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY
62-63 (1980); F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 127-38 (describing period of federal policies of allotment
and assimilation); F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 206-10 (describing circumstances of passage of General Allotment Act including Indian opposition).
24. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553. See also Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640, 648 (1912); Cherokee
Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 93 (1906).
Federal plenary power has never been construed as absolute, in the sense of beyond any constitutional limits; takings of Indian property have been held to be compensable under the fifth amendment. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. The most extraordinary power has been that of
managing and altering the form of tribal land. At various times, the federal government has leased,
sold, and allotted tribal land without Indian consent. In Lone Wolf, it had compelled distribution of
tribal land to tribal members individually, without compensation to the tribe. Whether the government could constitutionally do this to corporations or other collective entities is open to question.
Cf. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (sustaining state power to force sales of
trust property to individuals).
The Court's essential purpose in using the term plenary power is to distinguish enumerated
federal powers over other citizens from power over Indians. In other words, federal power over
Indians includes the constitutional powers that both the federal government and the states exercise
over other persons. Because of the modern expansion of federal authority over all persons under the
commerce and spending powers, the distinction is of reduced importance except as a reminder of
federal limits on state authority over Indian country. By contrast, scholars who criticize the plenary
power doctrine seek to immunize tribes against both state and federal power. See infra notes 35-38
and accompanying text.
25. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 639-46.
26. See id. at 180-206. Since 1960, both major political parties have pledged not to alter tribal
status without tribal consent. See IV A.

SCHLESINGER,

F. ISRAEL & W. HANSEN, HISTORY OF

1789-1968, at 3505-06, 3529 (1971).
27. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 734 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); Brief for the United
States in id. at 28. Cf. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1976) ("plenary
nature of Congress' power in matters of Indian affairs 'does not mean that all federal legislation
concerning Indians is... immune from judicial scrutiny or that claims, such as those presented by
appellees, are not justiciable,'" (quoting Brief for the Department of the Interior at 19 n.19)). The
Supreme Court unanimously sustained a recent exercise of federal power to override Indian treaties
in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
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Tribal Sovereignty at the Sufferance of Congress.

B.

Most Indian treaties had three explicit provisions that represented the
heart of the agreement. The tribal party acknowledged the superior sovereignty of the United States, it ceded to the United States a part of its original
territory, and the United States recognized the tribe's exclusive right to tribal territory not ceded. 28 Practice under the early treaties was to leave internal governance of retained tribal territory to tribal authority except for
interracial trade and crimes. The Indian nations continued to exercise internal sovereignty under their own laws. When tribal sovereignty was chalto
lenged by state governments, the Supreme Court construed the treaties
29
guarantee internal tribal sovereignty free of interference by states.
After treaty making ended, the dominant federal Indian policy became
assimilation. The government took actions to undermine tribal sovereignty,
by breaking up the tribal land base and by controlling tribal government
through the Bureau of Indian Atfairs. 30 A few tribes challenged federal
power, but the courts sustained it.31 When federal policy shifted back to
Indian self-determination, the courts again protected tribal sovereignty from
state governments but continued to acknowledge federal power to abolish
it.32

In summary, while formally allowing Indians to decide about tribal sovereignty, the federal government has attempted to persuade Indians to give it
up, has manipulated it in practice, and has consistently claimed the power to
eliminate it. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that tribal sovereignty
"exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeaexercised that power, the Court has
sance." 33 When Congress has explicitly
34
unanimously sustained the effort.
In recent years, scholars have attacked the doctrine of plenary federal
power, claiming constitutional protection for tribal sovereignty against congressional interference.3 5 Arguments rest on constructions of several differ28. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 232-35.
29. Eg., The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 737 (1867); Worcester, 31 U.S. 515.
30. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 127-43.

31. E.g., Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553.
32. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1986); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
33. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
34. E.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85
(1886). Rice had a dissent, but it was not based on lack of constitutional power; not even in dissent
has any justice argued in favor of constitutional limits on congressional power. The closest the
Court has come, other than in cases adjudicating takings of Indian property, was the dictum in
Delaware Tribe v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1976), quoted supra note 27. However, the point of that
dictum appears to be to deny that plenary power means absolute power, a point long settled by the
decisions finding constitutional protections for Indian property. See supra note 24.
35. The article most directly on point is Newton, FederalPower over Indians: Its Sources, Scope
and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. Rav. 195 (1984). See also R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note
23; Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 1, 67-113; Clinton, Isolated
in Their Own Country: A Defense of FederalProtectionof Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33
STAN. L. REv. 979, 996-1001 (1981). Cf.Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 20-24;
Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1981) (U.S. advocated similar position re Indian immunity from state jurisdiction).
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ent clauses of the Constitution. 36 Other scholars have questioned
congressional power to override treaties. 37 Still others have articulated sovereign rights for tribes under international law. 38 However, these theories
have made no headway in the Supreme Court. The Court adheres to the
concept that Indian sovereignty and treaties depend on federal policy, so
that the only task of the courts is to interpret what Congress and the executive branch have done. 39 The Court sustains attempts by states to govern
Indians and reservation lands unless state power is preempted by federal
treaties, statutes, and executive orders. 4°
Thus, prevailing constitutional theory recognizes Congress' power to
govern Indian tribes any way it likes with virtually no substantive constitutional limitations. Congress can govern individual Indians under the same
standards as other citizens, and on reservations or over Indian trust property, it has greater authority over Indians than over other persons.

A.

II. INDIAN
The Consent of the Governed.

CONSENT

That governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the
governed" is among the Declaration's self-evident truths. 4 1 It is a fundamental principle of the Constitution. Original consent is manifest in the Pre42
amble and in the Constitution's genesis in popular ratifying conventions.
This form of popular consent traces to Locke's vision of the original compact among free men. 43 Popular consent is further evidenced by the Constitution's principle that powers not expressly granted are retained by the
36. Professor Newton relied principally on the due process clause of the fifth amendment.

Newton, supra note 35, at 261-67. Professors Barsh and Henderson relied principally on the ninth
amendment and on article I, § 2, cl.3. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 257-69,
Professor Clinton relied on the commerce clause, Clinton, supranote 35, at 996-1001, as did the U.S.
brief in Ramah, 458 U.S. 832. Professor Ball argued that plenary power is lacking because no provision in the Constitution authorizes it. Ball, supra note 35, at 46-55.
37. See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1987); Westen, The Place of Foreign Treaties in the
Courts of the United States: A Reply to Louis Henkin, 101 HARv. L. REV. 511 (1987); Henkin,
Lexical Priority or "PoliticalQuestion A Response, 101 HARv. L. Rv. 524 (1987). Although
these writings are about foreign treaties, Indian treaties are discussed, and many of the arguments
apply to both.
38. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supranote 23, at 33-49; Andress & Falkowski, Self-Determination: Indians and the United Nations-The Anomalous Status of America's "DomesticDependent Nations", 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 97 (1980); Barsh, Indigenous North America and
ContemporaryInternationalLaw, 62 OR. L. REv. 73 (1983); Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object ofInternationalLaw, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 369 (1986); Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty &
Self-Determination: Rights of Native Americans Under InternationalLaw, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 669
(1978); Ryan, IndianNations Comparedto OtherNations, 3 AM. INDIAN J. 2 (1977); Williams, The
Algebra ofFederalIndian Law: The Hard TrailofDecolonizing andAmericanizing the White Man's
Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219 [hereinafter Algebra]; Williams, Learning Not to Live with
EurocentricMyopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of
Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 ARiz L. REv. 439, 454-55 (1988).
39. See supra note 22.
40. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 141-45 (1980); McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
41. The Declaration of Independence 2 (U.S. 1776).
42. U.S. CONST. preamble. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 530-36 (1969).
43. See J.LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil Government
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people, a concept so radical at the time that some were incredulous. 44 The
Bill of Rights expressly withdrew powers from the government and reiterated that powers not explicitly granted were denied. 45 Continuing consent is
achieved by popular election of those vested with governmental power, to
serve fixed terms of moderate duration, and by the opportunity for amendment.4 6 That the framers intended popular consent to be the foundation of
American government is beyond cavil. 47
Indian people did not consent to the Constitution's establishment, and
the vote was denied them until this century. However, they are now citizens
and entitled to vote during adulthood, which counts as the foundation of
consent under the principles of liberal democracy embodied in the Constitution.4 8 Are these principles properly applied to Indians?
The courts and other arms of the government must generally assume
that they are. Being creatures of the Constitution, they have no license to
doubt its applicability. In one of the most remarkable passages in any
Supreme Court opinion, the Marshall Court expressly admitted this limit on
its capacity to consider the condition of the Indians.49 Moreover, as individuals Indians may elect to ignore or even renounce tribal ties
and participate
50
in American society on the same terms as other citizens.
Yet most Indian people retain tribal ties. Many prefer to live in reservation communities despite poverty and hardship, and others would return if
[Second Treatise of Government], in TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, at 63-81 (C. Sherman ed. 1937, orig. publ. 1689).
Other political philosophers who influenced the framers materially differed from Locke about
the concept of consent. Hobbes said that "the right of all sovereigns is derived originally from the
consent of every one of those that are to be governed," but he defined consent very broadly, to
include that given "to save their lives, by submission to a conquering enemy." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 377 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1957). Hume ridiculed Locke, saying that the circumstances of an
original compact to govern by consent had never occurred in known human history. See D. Hume,
Of the Original Compact, in 3 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, at 443 (T. Green & T. Grose eds. 1964,
orig. pub. 1741). But the Americans came closer to Locke's vision than Hume had thought possible.
In any case, Locke's view represented the dominant social contract theory at the time of the Constitution. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 161-75
(1967); P. RILEY, WILL AND LEGITIMACY 1-2 (1982). On its continuing acceptance, see Whelan,
supra note 1.
Locke's writings several times referred to Native American societies in relation to his vision of
the original compact. See Deloria, Minoritiesand the Social Contract, 20 GA. L. REV. 917, 921-24
(1986). But in this country, his labor theory of property was relied on to show the allegedly superior
claim of agriculturists to hunters and gatherers, thus to justify displacing Indians. See J. LOCKE,
supra, at 18-33; Williams, The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 So. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1983).
44. See G. WOOD, supra note 42, at 536-43.
45. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 3; art. II, § 1. See also id. at art. IV, § 4, the republican guarantee
clause, which was understood to guarantee popular government. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at
250-51 (J. Madison), No. 43, at 291-92 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). However, the framers'
concept of popular government did not equate with straightforward majority rule. The constitutional scheme deliberately divided power to blunt majority oppression. See THE FEDERALIST Nos.
10 & 51 (J. Madison); infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
Professor Emerson has argued that the "right of consent" is protected by the free expression
clauses of the first amendment. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 8 (1970).
47. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison).
48. Id.
49. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588-92 (1823).
50. See United States ex rel Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879) (No.
14,891); F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 177-78, 268.
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economic conditions were better. As a result, the original Constitution's relationship to Indian nations remains more important than modem Indian
citizenship. The original basis for Indian consent was collective, not individual. The United States addressed the tribes as national groups. The evolution of this relationship shows a continuing concern with tribal, rather than
individual, consent.
B. PoliticalActions Based on Indian Consent.
Indian consent has been honored, albeit imperfectly, through policy
choices of Congress and the President. Before the Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance established a compact between the federal government and
new states. 51 It required that:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians;
their land and property shall never be taken from them without their
consent; and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be
invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by
Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to
done to them, and for pretime be made, for preventing wrongs being
52
serving peace and friendship with them.
Other statutes required federal approval to acquire land ownership from
53
tribes, directly protecting the policy declared in the Northwest Ordinance.
Most importantly, in the formative years the government sought Indian consent by dealing with tribes primarily through treaties.
After treaty making ended, the government continued to deal with
tribes by agreement. 54 The policy of allotment was imposed on tribes, but
only after vigorous argument in Congress, in which advocates of consent lost
only after years of debate.5 5 The Supreme Court's 1903 decision in Lone
Wolfv. Hitchcock 56 is the leading authority to sustain federal power to override an Indian treaty. The remarkable fact is that the decision came57so late
in the day, that as late as 1903 there was doubt about the question.
51. Ordinance of July 23, 1787, § 14, 32 J. CONT. CONG. 334, 340 (1787), reenacted as
amended, Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
52. Id. § 14, art. III, 1 Stat, at 52.
53. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 510-22 (describing so-called "nonintercourse acts"). See
also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658-69 (1979) (discussing statute allocating the
burden of proof to whites claiming property from Indians). The "nonintercourse" statutes prohibiting direct land purchases from tribes might seem at first look to be the antithesis of Indian consent
because they prohibited voluntary tribal transfers of land. However, in the context of frontier conditions, the federal protection usually operated to prevent land acquisitions from tribes that were unfair and in reality not consensual.
54. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 107; F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 67. For many years after
1871, agreements with tribes were popularly called treaties, in and out of Congress, despite technical
misuse of the term. See, eg., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (quoting
Cong. Burke, "In 1901 a treaty was entered into with the Rosebud Indians .... "). In Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975), the Court compared the legal status of treaties and agreements.
See id. at 200-04; id. at 213-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. See F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRIsIs 252 (1976).
56. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
57. The Court had reached the same conclusion in The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (I1 Wall.)
616 (1871), but the case was decided by six Justices, and two dissented. Apparently for this reason,
it was not considered a definitive precedent. Also, the issue decided was much less important. When
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In modem times, the Indian Reorganization Act5 8 was made subject to

Indian consent by referendum. 5 9 The now-discredited termination policy of
the 1950s was carried out with consent of most of the affected tribes. 60 Public Law 280 was imposed on tribes in 1953, but after reconsideration in
1968, it was made subject to tribal consent by referendum. 6 1 Congress
adopted the 1971 land settlement with Alaska Natives on the assumption
that their consent should be its foundation. 62 And since 1960, both major
have expressly established Indian consent as the basis for
political parties
63
federal policy.

Nevertheless, the consent policies of the political branches have been
uneven and imperfect. Many tribes never made treaties with the government, and the conditions under which Indian treaties and agreements were
made limit their value as a just basis for Indian consent. 64 In most cases
there was substantial coercion of the tribal party. The premises and terms of
discourse were those of the white man's law, grounded in English history,
culture, and language. The European concept of nationhood did not fit
many tribal societies, so that the treating party became an artificial amalgamation of small bands of people theretofore independent. 65 In some cases
the process was deliberately corrupted by federal selection of the persons to
be recognized as tribal leaders. 66 At times, Indian property was seized outright with no semblance of consent, and the federal government was often
unable or unwilling to control trespassing on Indian land. 67 Many statutes
68
and bureaucratic and military rules were simply imposed on Indians.
Lone Wolf was decided, the issue was considered open. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 59294.
58. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended and supplemented at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1982)).
59. Id. § 18, 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1982).
60. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 152-80. There can be little doubt that many Indian people
who agreed to termination were either misled or came to regret their decision. But in one way or
another, that is a feature of many exercises of democratic consent.
61. See id. at 175-77, 362-63; 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982).
62. See M. BERRY, THE ALASKA PIPELINE: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND
CLAIMS 124-214 (1975) (history of ANCSA, including approval by Alaska Federation of Natives).
63. See supra note 26. The recent working out of competing state and tribal authority over
interracial gambling in Indian country illustrates both the policy of consent and its limits. See Act of
Oct. 17, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100497, 102 Stat. 2467-88. The statute provides for federal regulation of
gaming on Indian lands. In effect, it allows tribes to operate bingo games free of state rules and
control but imits other kinds of reservation gambling enterprises to those allowed by each state. It
is very much a compromise.
64. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 5, at 608-12.
65. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
66. See United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 211 (W.D. Mich. 1979), modified, 653
F.2d 277 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL 263-66
(1932).
67. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1980). The most important issue was the legal response the U.S. would make to white squatters who occupied Indian
lands without legal right, then politicked to validate their possession. See, eg., D. FELLER, THE
PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS 126-29, 197-98 (1984) (describing preemption laws).
68. See, eg., F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 174-77 (describing administrative and military policies
of forcibly confining Indians to reservations without legal authority).

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

C.

[Vol. 31

JudicialActions Based on Indian Consent.

The uneven political efforts to govern with tribal consent are not the full
story. When Congress has acted with doubtful Indian consent or contrary to
it, the courts have adopted ameliorative policies. Whatever the abstract constitutional theory, the devastating power of a distant legislature, not beholden to Indian votes or to Indian consent in any other way, is a jarring
dissonance in a democratic polity. The courts have obviously been influenced by this inharmonious chord in the constitutional symphony.
Unable to confront the constitutional issue head on, the courts evolved
strategies that to some extent resemble the emergence of courts of equity.
These manifest themselves in legal analogies that don't quite fit their common law clothing, such as Indian wardship and the trust responsibility of the
federal government. 69 They emerge most frankly in the Supreme Court's
canons of construction for Indian treaties and for federal statutes affecting
Indians. 70 While stated as several distinct rules, all of them require that
courts construe ambiguities in Indian treaties and in federal statutes favorably to the Indian side of a dispute.
The Court's first analogy was to common law wardship, the Marshall
Court's statement that the tribes' "relation to the United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian." '7 1 While this description is now viewed as
demeaning to Indian people and is out of favor, its purpose when made was
to imply a federal duty of protection for Indians and their property against
the hostility and land hunger of frontier whites. The "resembl[ance]" to
wardship was legally apt on the basis of the constitutional rule that Congress
has plenary power over Indians without their consent, a description that to
some extent fits the relation of guardian and ward. 72 Implying that the federal government in turn has a guardian's fiduciary duties was the more daring side of the analogy, and it developed into the trust relationship of today.
1. Consent and the Sovereignty Doctrine.
Under the legal and social conditions of eighteenth and nineteenth century America, Indian consent cannot be found on the basis of social contract
or any like theory of individual consent. 73 The treaties and agreements
tribes made with the United States are a much more satisfactory source of
Indian consent to the constitutional system. But as already noted, many of
them were made coercively, with at best only partial Indian consent, and
many tribes made no treaties or other agreements with the government.
These limitations were least important in the earliest years of dealings
between the United States and the most powerful Indian nations. When the
nation was founded, some frontier tribes were a significant military threat to
the national security. The United States rightly feared them in their own
69. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
71. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
72. See 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardianshipand Ward § 1 (1968). The Court's rule on plenary power
is outlined supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text. For a description of various legal uses of the
guardian-ward analogy, see F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 169-73.
73. See Deloria, supra note 43.

INDIAN CONSENT

right and as potential allies of Britain or other European powers. 74 Treaties
under these circumstances were relatively freely made by tribal parties.
They were the most voluntary basis for Indian consent before the modern
period of Indian citizenship. They were the best available accommodation
between the condition of the Indians and the principle of consent of the
governed.
The Supreme Court has implicitly chosen early treaties with powerful
tribes, which I shall call the peace treaties, as the benchmark for interpreting
federal Indian policy. It has been right to do so not only because of the
general legislative policy of seeking Indian consent, 75 but also because consent of the governed is a fundamental principle of our constitutional order
that should guide the courts' interpretations within the bounds of other constitutional and statutory limits.
The Court's derivation of policy from the peace treaties may be seen in
its decisions recognizing and defining tribal sovereignty over Indian country. As is widely known, the Court first decided that treaties reserved tribal
sovereignty in Worcester v. Georgia.76 None of the treaties between the
Cherokee Nation and the United States explicitly reserved tribal sovereignty,
and the Court decided on the basis of implications. But this did not distort
the treaties' terms or conditions. The words of the early treaties, read in
light of extant acts of Congress, the circumstances of the Cherokees, and the
actual conduct of federal, tribal, and state governments at the time of the
treaties, made the Court's construction the most reasonable reading of the
77
actual intent of the treaty parties.
The Worcester decision was highly controversial, 78 but not because it
inaccurately reflected the intent of the parties to the basic agreements between the Cherokees and the United States in 1785 and 1791. 79 Rather,
social and military conditions had vastly changed between the treaty dates
and 1832. Indian tribes had ceased to be a military threat to the security of
the United States itself (as opposed to isolated situations on the frontier) at
least by 1814, after we had settled our differences with Britain, if not somewhat earlier.80 Treaties after that date, including several with the Cherokees, reflected the general assumption that the United States had the power
to impose any terms it wished.8 1 President Jackson was elected based in part
on his public recognition of this new reality and his willingness to alter the
74. See 1 F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT WHITE FATHER 61-80 (1984).
75. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
76. Worcester, 31 U.S. 515.
77. Each of these bases for inference about treaty purposes was relied on by the Court. See id.
at 542-50, 556-57, 560. The only Indian treaties that expressly reserved tribal sovereignty were three
of the "Indian Territory" removal treaties made between 1830 and 1838. They contemplated an
Indian commonwealth outside the boundaries of any state or territory, a vision that lasted until the
admission of Oklahoma in 1907. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 261-62, 770-75.
78. See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics,and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv.

500, 520-31 (1969).
79. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 550-56.
80. See 1F. PRUCHA, supra note 74, at 80-88, 194. The military question in particular frontier
situations remained for many decades; the text refers to the security of the nation as a whole. Prucha
mentions military campaigns and some concerns with foreign alliances after 1814, but even these
sporadic events had ended by 1825.
81. See Treaty with the Creeks (Treaty of Ft. Jackson), Aug. 9, 1814, 7 Stat. 120, which reveals
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relationship with Indian tribes accordingly. 82 So the Worcester interpretation, while accurately reflecting conditions when the treaties were made, was
out of phase with circumstances at the time the case was decided.
Because of changed circumstances, the Court could have inferred that
the later Cherokee treaties implicitly yielded tribal sovereignty based on the
circumstances of their making. Instead, the opinion relied almost entirely on
the earliest Cherokee treaty as the foundation for its decision.8 3 The Court
selected the treaty most accurately reflecting Cherokee consent. The opinion
noted that the United States wanted peace and that the federal negotiators
sought out the Cherokees in their own country. 84 In contrast, many later
treaties with tribes were made at military forts or even in Washington.8"
After 1814, treaty terms were only as fair as the Government's benevolence
decided to make them. But many of the early treaties were true bargains.
If one looks in isolation to most of the post-1814 Indian treaties and to
the conditions of their adoption, an inference that the treaty parties intended
86
to reserve internal self-government to the tribal party is often doubtful.
That the Court has uniformly implied such intent in all Indian treaties that
do not expressly state the contrary 87 can be justified only by attributing a
general federal policy to underlie all the treaties and by deriving the foundations of that policy from the peace treaty period.
The Court's second examination of the question did not come until its
decision in the Kansas case of 1867.88 The right of three tribes to self-government was at issue, and the governing treaties presented a much more
doubtful case for reserved sovereignty than had the Cherokee treaties in
Worcester. Moreover, conditions for these tribes had changed more radically than they had for the Cherokees in 1832. State authorities urged the
Court to recognize that the Indians had become too much integrated into
local life to justify continuing tribal sovereignty. 89 But the Court refused to
depart from the standard it had set in Worcester, requiring consent of the
tribes to effect a change. 90
the change in relationships. Its terms scolded the Creek Nation for wrongs by Creeks, and many of
the treaty terms began with the words, "The United States demand .... "
82. See Burke, supra note 78, at 528-29. Jackson had expressed this view publicly as early as

1817. See I F. PRUCHA, supra note 74, at 191-92. In 1829-30, Jackson's cabinet members argued
that the Cherokee treaties gave the Cherokees neither property nor governmental rights. Id. at 19394. Because the state of Georgia did not appear before the Supreme Court in Worcester, the pertinent parts of these claims served as a surrogate brief for the state, their arguments directly answered
by the Court. Thus the Worcester decision was as much a rebuff to the President as to the state.
However, these were highly political arguments that lacked any reasoned basis in the terms and

conditions of the actual treaties.
83. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 550-54.
84. Id. at 550.
85. See, eg., 2 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES 594-600, 772-90 (1904).
86. For example, consider the 1868 treaty with the Navajos, 15 Stat. 667 (1868). It was made
while the tribe was imprisoned at Fort Sumner in eastern New Mexico, far from tribal territory. The
treaty terms simply set aside the reservation for the exclusive use of the Navajos and other Indians
under the superintendence of the government. Yet the Court has interpreted the Navajo Treaty to
apply "the basic policy of Worcester." Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
87. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 259-79; infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
88. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737.
89. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 262-63.
90. 72 U.S. at 757, 760-61. It is interesting that the Court did not mention the possibility of
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The Court again sustained tribal sovereignty in Ex parte Crow Dog.9 1
Although, the applicable Sioux Treaty of 1868 and agreement of 1877 included express language subjecting the Sioux "to the laws of the United
sustained tribal sovereignty in terms derived from the
States," 92 the Court 93
Worcester precedent.
Three years later, the Court reviewed the power of Congress to punish
an Indian for murder committed on a reservation under a statute passed in
reaction to the Crow Dog decision. 94 One of the issues raised was congressional power, and concomitant immunity from state law, over the reservation in question because it had been established by executive order after
statehood for tribes that had no treaty or agreement with the United States.
The Court sustained the statute, and its opinion affirmed the tribes' right of
95
self-government on the reservation based on the Worcester precedent. 96
Modem decisions are based on the continuing validity of these principles.
One might try to explain these cases on the basis of continuity of policy,
the assumption that federal policy remains constant to the extent it is not
deliberately changed. But this concept alone would be greatly strained to
account for the decisions. Many tribal reservations were established after
the dominant policy of the federal government had clearly shifted to assimilation and break-up of the tribal land base. 97 A federal statute or executive
order setting aside a reservation during the assimilation period, interpreted
in light of then-current policy, could reasonably be read not to reserve tribal
sovereignty; that might well be the most reasonable reading of it in isolation.
Even treaties or agreements of that period can reasonably be interpreted the
same way.
2. Consent and the Limits of TribalPower.
The Court's reliance on the peace treaties can also be seen in its decisions finding limits to tribal sovereignty. In Oliphant-v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,98 the Court held that tribes retain no authority to punish non-Indians
who violate tribal criminal laws. The Court's opinion relied on the understandings established in early treaties. While the Court's interpretation has
been questioned, 99 its point of reference in the treaties was correct.
unilateral abrogation of tribal sovereignty by act of Congress. See supranotes 56-57 and accompanying text.
91. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). See also United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1877) (dictum).

92. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 568 (quoting Act of Feb. 28, 1877, ch. 72, 19 Stat. 254). See also id.
at 563 (quoting Treaty with the Sioux, Apr. 29, 1868, art. I, 15 Stat. 635) ("subject to the authority
of the United States").

93. See id., 109 U.S. at 572.
94. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375.
95. See id, at 381-85.
96. Eg., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S 130, 133 n.1 (1982); Williams v. Lee, 358

U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
97. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 98-102, 127-38.

98. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
99. See, eg., Ball, supranote 35, at 36-44; Williams, Algebra, supranote 38, at 267-74; Barsh &
Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L.

REv.609 (1979).
Despite criticism, there has been no questioning of the decision within the Court since it was
announced. Moreover, the decision's author is now Chief Justice, and Justice Kennedy had voted
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The Oliphant Court had to contend with the general rule of Worcester v.
Georgia, that Indian sovereignty is the retained, original sovereignty of the
Indian nations, so that tribes have whatever sovereignty has not been ceded
by them or taken from them. 100 The Court also had to accommodate the
rule that ambiguities in treaties should be interpreted favorably to Indian
sovereignty. 10 1 The Court decided that tribal powers can be divested implicitly as well as explicitly.10 2 That proposition is relatively uncontroversial
when applied to external affairs, to implicit divestment of tribal power to
make war and to deal directly with foreign nations.' 0 3 But the Oliphant
Court applied it to the more local power to punish non-Indians and decided
that that power had been implicitly given up as well.
The Court's opinion relied on the historical understanding of the three
federal branches and of tribal parties to treaties, including those at issue in
Worcester itself. 1°4 One can dispute whether the Court fairly interpreted
Indian consent and expectations under those treaties; this is often open to
argument and leads to disagreements within the Court itself, such as the
divided vote in Oliphant. But using the general treaty understanding as the
standard for Indian consent has broad support in the Court's decisions.
One may object that each Indian treaty is a separate agreement that
should be interpreted to carry out whatever its parties intended. So it
should, but the words of the treaties leave many questions unanswered.
Some of these answers must be derived from the general policy of the United
States, the party common to all the treaties. That policy in turn has often
been complex and unclear, so that more than one interpretation was reasonably open to a reviewing court. That the courts have usually chosen the
constructions most consistent with Indian consent is justified both by general
legislative policies favoring Indian consent, and by higher constitutional
principles.
3.

Consent and JudicialRules of Interpretation.

How should courts apply the sovereignty and federal trust doctrines?
The Supreme Court says we are to construe Indian treaties and statutes favorably to the Indians, but what outcome is favorable to them? This question has obvious answers in some situations but not in all. The rules are in
fact applied to sustain tribal sovereignty, federal restraints on alienation of
tribal property, and the reservation system.10 5 Are these institutions beneficial to Indian people? Social conditions on many reservations lead some
the same way in the court of appeals. See 544 F.2d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
100. See Oliphant,435 U.S. at 196; F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 122; see also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at
322.
101. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. The Oliphant opinion did not explicitly
address the rule.
102. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.
103. But see Ball, supra note 35, at 36-44; Williams, Algebra, supra note 38, at 267-74. Treaties

with tribes explicitly provided for peace between the parties, and some of them specified that the
tribe would not ally itself with any other nation than the United States. See, e.g., Treaty with the
Cherokees, July 2, 1791, art. 2, 7 Stat. 39.
104. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197-201.
105. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 220-25.
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observers to doubt that they are. And these are profound policy questions of
a sort that we generally do not expect courts to resolve.
The Court's canon for treaties is consistent with general rules of interpretation. Indian treaties are to be interpreted as the Indian parties would
have understood them, in light of language and cultural barriers.10 6 This
principle directly honors Indian consent, but in a circumstance when traditional law would also do so. Treaty interpretation in international law seeks
to give effect to the parties' intent. When the treaty memorial is in the language of one party, at best imperfectly understood by the other, it is well
established that the other party's understanding should define the scope of
interpretation. 107 This reading is supported by the relative power of the two
parties; there is precedent for considering the circumstances of a weaker
party and reading an agreement to meet its reasonable expectations. 10 8 Domestic contract law has similar doctrines.10 9
However, the rule that federal Indian statutes and executive orders are
interpreted favorably to Indians1 10 has no analogous support in international
law or in the domestic law of contracts. It must rest squarely on the principle of Indian consent. While recognizing Congress' extraordinary power
over Indians and tribes, unchecked by political power or other necessary
consent of the Indians, the Court has ameliorated its harshness by requiring
that measures imposed on Indians be clearly stated.111 Statutes will not be
read technically against Indian interests, any more than will treaties.1 12 Uncertainties in statutory words will, like treaty terms, be read to accord with
the Indians' reasonable expectations and with our best measure of Indian
consent, the understandings in the peace treaties.
The grounding of the Court's decisions tells us how to apply the canons
of construction. When lawyers first encounter the canons, they are often
perplexed. As there are always ambiguities in a statute, do these rules mean
that the Indians always win? They can't mean that. If they don't, how can
we tell when the rules matter? Or if the rules don't matter, is the actual rule
window dressing? At least
merely congressional intent and the canons just 113
one Supreme Court justice read them that way.
The answers depend on the principle of consent. The canons are based
on the Court's policy of tempering unchecked federal power by relying on
the best available grounds to honor Indian consent. Statutes imposed on
106. E.g., Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1978) (quoting Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)). The concept was first stated in Justice McLean's concurring opinion
in Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582 (McLean, J., concurring). See also The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 760;
F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 37-38, 296.
107. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 130 (1962).

108. See id.
109. See supra note 5.
110. See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
111. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 221-25.
112. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976); Antoine, 420 U.S. at 199-200. Cf.
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899) ("The treaty must therefore be construed, not according to
the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense they would naturally be
understood by the Indians.").

113. See Northwestern Band of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 353 (1945)

(Reed, J., writing for the Court). See also Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 11 (1956) (Reed, J.,
dissenting); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281-91 (1955).
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Indians are interpreted as if they were agreements, to sustain what the Indians reasonably could have expected at the time. The benchmark for interpretation is the general understanding in the early peace treaties, when the
tribes did in fact consent. We begin with the set of understandings embodied
in the early treaties, and we ask whether a later treaty or statute clearly
departed from that set of understandings. That is why Indian reservations
established under executive orders and statutes are presumed to have the
same status as those established under the peace treaties. Properly understood, the implicit judicial message to Congress is, you have plenary power
to dictate to the Indians, contrary to their consent, but consent is such a vital
constitutional principle that we shall require you to exercise that power
openly and plainly.
Some examples involving non-treaty tribes serve to illustrate this analysis. One of the most remarkable uses of the rule that federal statutes be
interpreted favorably to Indians occurred in Alaska Pacific Fisheries v.
United States. 14 In 1887, Metlakatla Indians migrated to Alaska from British Columbia. In 1891, Congress by statute set aside the Annette Islands as
a "reserve" for them. 115 Later, the United States as trustee for the
Metlakatlas sued non-Indian fishermen to enjoin them from fishing in the
ocean waters near the Annette Islands, on the theory that the statute implicitly reserved the waters for the Indians' exclusive use. The Supreme Court
unanimously agreed, despite the usually strict rule that federal reservations
of navigable waters must be explicit." 6 In this case, the particular facts gave
no reason to invoke policies derived from Indian consent and federal trusteeship undertaken by treaty or agreement. Yet the tradition of addressing all
Indian nations as if they had agreed is so strong that it was applied even to
an "immigrant" tribe.
The Jicarilla Apache Reservation in New Mexico furnishes another example. The Jicarillas have no treaty, and the reservation was set aside by
executive order of President Cleveland in 1887. Nevertheless, the tribe's
right of internal sovereignty is the same as that of treaty tribes. In one of the
leading precedents addressing tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation, the Supreme Court explicitly so held." 7 Other examples are the
Colville Reservation in Washington, set aside by executive order of President
Grant in 1872,118 and the Hopi Reservation in Arizona, reserved by order of
President Arthur in 1884.119 Although neither tribe has a treaty, their right
of self-government is consistently respected on the same basis as that of
treaty tribes.' 20 Even these terse executive orders are interpreted to apply
114. 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
115. Id. at 86.
116. On the usual rule applied to Indians who were not fishermen, see Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 550-57 (1981).
117. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133 n.l. See also Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 204 n.1 (1986); New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 326 (1983).
118. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
119. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963).
120. Re Colville, see Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 143 n.12 (1980);

Colville, 647 F.2d at 44. See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 138 n.1
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principles derived from the peace treaties and linked to them through the
principle of consent of the governed.
III.
A.

INDIANS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The Protection of ConstitutionalStructure.

Recent efforts to find a constitutional right to tribal sovereignty have at
least two implicit premises. One is the fear that tribal sovereignty cannot
withstand popular majorities in this country. For most of our history, this
premise was clearly correct; a national referendum would have rejected tribal sovereignty. In modern times, Indian self-determination has had a degree of popular political approval, although even today the outcome of a
national referendum would be uncertain. In frontier states, popular rejection would have been assured, and many states with reservations would vote
that way today.1 2 1 Moreover, the national political wind could shift again;
tribes cannot take present tolerance for granted.
The second premise of the constitutional-right-to-sovereignty effort is
the assumption that without it, there is no constitutional protection for tribal
sovereignty. Modern constitutional law's domination by the jurisprudence
of rights induces many to think that judicial protection of extra-majoritarian
constitutional rights is the only secure way to protect basic values.
The premise is mistaken. For most of the history of this country, the
structural and procedural devices of the Constitution did more to protect
personal rights than did its formal personal rights guarantees. 122 The devices to spread power in a federal system with separation of powers, bicameralism, executive veto, judicial independence, and other checks and
balances were the major bulwarks of liberty under the original Constitution
and indeed until modern times.
The structural devices were inadequate to address some fundamental
needs. The rights of black people, the principle of one person one vote, and
humane adjustment of the criminal justice system to the industrial state are
modern advances under the banner of personal rights. But what relation
have these developments to tribal sovereignty?
Tribal sovereignty still rests on an 1832 decision written by a slaveowning judge from Virginia. 12 3 Modern personal rights law has not advanced the doctrine and is unlikely to do so. Moreover, the sovereignty doctrine has in fact been protected from majority will for over a century by the
original constitutional structure, which effectively protects it today. It is
structural protections that make the Court's statements about congressional
(1980). Re Hopi, see Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 1118 (1976).
121. See, eg., D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 733 (2d ed. 1986) (reference to 1984 Washington State referendum banning Indian treaty fishing for steelhead, although by a
narrow margin).
122. For example, important judicial enforcement of the first amendment did not begin until
1930, but the United States has had substantial freedom of expression throughout its history. See
Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 302, 314-16
(1984).
123. See L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 715 (1974).
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power over tribes far less threatening in practice than they appear in the
abstract.
For Indians, the most important structural protection is the federal system itself and the allocation of paramount power to the federal government
rather than the states. 124 This prevents both local authority over tribes and
popular referenda under state law to determine Indian rights.
During the nineteenth century, this principle was a vital protection for
Indian people. As a minority race feared and hated by many white Americans and as owners of vast tracts of land coveted by settlers, Indians and
tribes would have suffered much more under state and local jurisdiction than
they did under federal. Recall the sorry case of Texas, which had ten years
as an independent republic, during which tribes were subject to direct popular rule. Most Texas tribes were either driven out of the state or wiped out,
and their lands were taken.1 2 5 Other infamous acts toward Native Americans can be directly traced to local hostility that overcame federal authority.
For example, the notorious Sand Creek Massacre was by soldiers commanded from Denver, not Washington. 126 Federal protection of tribal land
was often inadequate, but considering voters' attitudes, it is remarkable that
so much was protected.
The Constitution does not authorize national referenda, about tribal
sovereignty or anything else. National legislation can be adopted only according to the framers' republican system of representation, by approval of
three diverse organs of government,1 27 a structure that substantially blunts
majority oppression. In other words, the plenary power of Congress over
Indians and tribes, the bugbear itself, has the important effect of preventing a
popular referendum on tribal sovereignty.
The constitutional structure protects tribal sovereignty in a third,
equally important, way. The federal judiciary's extraordinary immunity
from popular control guards tribal rights from transient popular will, even
1 28
within the federal government.
In sum, the structure of the original Constitution, so inadequate to
black Americans, has provided substantial protection to Native Americans.
Even in the modem era of civil rights, Indian people derive more important
constitutional protections from the 1787 provisions than from the fourteenth
amendment and civil rights statutes. Of course, much harm was done. But
given the power of the United States and the attitude of most of its citizens,
any constitution that might have been adopted would have had negative impacts on Indian people. The judgments we make now must consider the
124. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557-59.
125. See 1 F. PRUCHA, supra note 74, at 354-56.
126. See C. ABBo1rr, S. LEONARD & D. MCCOMB, COLORADO 73-78 (rev. ed. 1982). California
supplies numerous examples. At many times in state history, local authorities were able to weaken
and even prevent federal protection of Indian rights. The most important was defeating ratification
of treaties negotiated with California tribes. See 1 F. PRUCHA, supra note 74, at 384-87. See also
California Private Land Claims Act, Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631, interpreted in Barker v.
Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901).
127. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
128. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
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circumstances of past events and the alternative choices that were realistically available.
B.

The Uncertain Protectionsof Rights.

The protection of constitutional structure is not alone an adequate response to advocates of a constitutional right of tribal sovereignty. One can
concede structural protection, point out its failures, and claim that more
protection is desirable. Thus, let us consider the feasibility of a regime of
judicial protection of a constitutional right of tribal sovereignty.
1. Tribes and the Tenth Amendment.
A basic principle of the Constitution is that the federal government exercises only enumerated powers, and all other governmental powers are allocated to the states. The tenth amendment was meant to make that principle
explicit. 129
Beginning with the celebrated case of McCulloch v. Maryland,130 the
Supreme Court repeatedly attempted judicial definitions of state sovereignty
protected by the Constitution from federal authority. Two opposing concepts vied for ascendancy: the view that the states' principal protection is
through the political process because of their powerful influence over the
federal government, and the view that the judiciary should be a primary and
vigorous guardian of state sovereignty. 13 1 While the issue is not dead, the
political process rule has been predominant since 1937. Probably the main
reason for the triumph of the political process rule is the perceived failure of
the Court to articulate a satisfactory theory for tenth amendment
adjudications. 132
If we hypothesize a constitutional right of tribal sovereignty, we must
consider how it might work in light of the history of the constitutional right
of state sovereignty. Plainly, the concept of protection through political
power, the modern Court's principal ground for refraining from judicial enforcement of the tenth amendment, has no application to Indian tribes. A
meaningful tribal right against the power of Congress would have to depend
on judicial definition and enforcement. The challenge, then, is to explain
how the Supreme Court could solve the definitional problem for tribal sovereignty that it failed to solve for state sovereignty.
This is a daunting problem. The constitutional theory of the federal
system is that the federal government has full authority to carry out its enumerated powers by directly governing all persons and property in the nation. 133 When it exercises its powers, conflicting state authority is displaced
under the supremacy clause.13 4 Under modern interpretations of the federal
powers to tax, spend, and regulate interstate and foreign commerce, federal
129. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 113 (3d ed. 1986).
130. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
131. See J. NOWAK, supra note 129, at 160-69.

132. See id. at 164-67.
133. See id. at 115-17.
134. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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power can reach a myriad of local activities.13 5 To be meaningful, a tribal
right of sovereignty would have to carve out a much greater immunity than
does existing constitutional law for state sovereignty.
One might respond that the Court has repeatedly said that the tenth
amendment does protect the core, the very existence, of state government
from federal power, 136 in contrast to statements that tribal power is subject
to complete defeasance by act of Congress. Thus, a tribal right of sovereignty would protect the same basic existence for tribal sovereignty. This is
true but not terribly significant. Most of the actual complaints that Indian
people have about unconsented exercises of federal power over tribal government would require greater judicial protection than guarding bare existence.
Most obviously, tribes want authority over non-Indians in tribal territory,
and existing federal law severely limits that power.1 3 7 It is hard to see how
broadening of that power would follow from judicial protection of a bare
right of existence. These difficulties show why some scholars who are dissatisfied with plenary federal power do not dally with reinterpretation of the
Constitution and directly invoke principles of international law or propose
13 8
constitutional amendments.
2. Tribes and the Bill of Rights.
Consider also the relation of Indians and tribes to the cherished American constitutional rights protecting property, equal protection of the laws,
and due process of law. Even today, these rights are more likely to be invoked against Indian interests than for their protection.
The judiciary has strongly protected property rights against popular infringements. How does that tradition affect Indians? Surely the verdict is
mixed at best. It is true that both tribal and individual Indian property has
been protected under the fifth amendment, 13 9 and Anglo-American concepts
of the sanctity of property have had something to do with the general federal
policy that tribal property should be bought rather than simply seized. Federal restraints on alienation prevented greater loss of Indian property than
has occurred.
Yet federal purchases from tribes often were coerced, and the courts
developed the evasions that aboriginal and executive order Indian titles are
not constitutionally protected.1'4 More directly harmful, the Anglo-American notion of individual property rights made tribal property held in common a target for abolition, an aberration that smacked of communism. The
135. See J. NOWAK, supra note 129, at 160-61.
136. See, e-g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (The Court has "ample power to
prevent ... the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign entity."). The one clear holding enforcing this vision of the tenth amendment is Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (voiding federal statute
dictating location of state capital city).
137. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text; F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 252-57.
138. On international law, see, eg., supra note 38 (articles by Professor Williams). Professors
Barsh and Henderson propose amending the U.S. Constitution and articulate the form of a proposed
amendment. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 279-82.
139. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 417-24

(1980).
140. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 485-99.
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government avoided simply grabbing Indian property, but it was quite will14 1
ing to compel the breakup of tribal common land into individual holdings.
And the great concern of Anglo-American law with free alienability of property has caused frequent attacks on Indian land ownership protections.142
Equal protection and due process have become important in modern
times with the resurgence of exercised tribal sovereignty. At every turn, tribal governments have met with rights-based arguments against the legitimacy of what they do. 14 3 The Supreme Court had to square the separate
governance of Indian country and other distinct rights of Indians with the
modern notion of race as a suspect class. 144 It reached the right conclusion
but awkwardly, almost apologetically. 145
In the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Congress imposed rights-based
limitations on tribes.1 46 While the Supreme Court blunted federal court enforcement of that act,'147 efforts to overturn the Court's holding are alive and
well.148 Undoubtedly, tribal governments have been oppressive at times; all
governments are. And it is fair to say that tribal governments could not
function in modern America without accommodating modern notions of
personal rights in some way. The point is simply that personal rights concepts have been more at war with tribal sovereignty than helpful to it.
In modern battles over tribal sovereignty, non-Indians persistently
claim that tribal authority over them is government without representation,
without consent of the governed. The claim has obvious force. 149 The usual
tribal response, that non-Indians elected to settle in Indian country, is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, in many cases non-Indians were induced to
settle in Indian country by federal assimilation policies that plainly gave little warning of tribal authority. 150 Circumstances gave clear notice only to
settlers in Indian Territory while it existed15 ' and to those arriving after the
modern resurgence of exercised tribal sovereignty. Second, the principle of
consent is too fundamental to rest on a permanent waiver by one's ancestors.
141. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553. See also F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 208 (disputes about

whether tribal ownership was "communism").
142. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 255-73 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
143. See, eg., cases discussed in F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 663-72.
144. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382,
390-91 (1976); Morton, 417 U.S. 535.
145. The Court upheld separate legal status for Indians, but it did so on the evasive basis that
Indians constitute a "political" rather than a racial classification. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at
653-60. Had these challenges succeeded, it is hard to see how tribal self-government could have
survived.
Felix Cohen's 1941 treatise argued that tribes are political rather than racial groups as a basis
for individual Indians to escape federal oppression. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 177. See also id. at
268-72 (existence of tribes in a "political sense").
146. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77-78 (codified at 25 U.S.C.

§§ 1301-1303 (1982)).
147. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
148. See S. 2747, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 11652-55 (1988); HearingBefore the
United States Comm'n on Civil Rights, Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act, Flagstaff, Ariz.
(Aug. 13-14, 1987).
149. See supra notes 1, 41-47 and accompanying text.
150. See F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 128-29, 136-43, 261-66.

151. See id. at 770-74.

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

The plenary power rule, while it has sanctioned federal oppression, provides an important response to this complaint by non-Indian residents of
Indian country. The federal government, a government whose political support overwhelmingly favors the values of the non-Indian residents over those
of their tribal hosts, provides an avenue of relief if tribal power over nonIndians becomes truly oppressive.15 2 Thus, plenary power gives democratic
15 3
legitimacy to tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
C. ConstitutionalStructure Remains the Vital Protection.
In sum, the only constitutional decision that really mattered for Indians
was the Worcester holding that the Constitution committed overriding
power to deal with tribes to the federal government and not to the states.
Because of that decision, every lawsuit about tribal sovereignty is, as a constitutional matter, based on construction of federal statutes or treaties. Because of that decision and federal statutes, anyone who covets tribal land or
opposes tribal sovereignty must run the gauntlet of federal legislative and
administrative processes and of judicial review. And because of the Court's
canons of construction, it is not even enough for coveters to get ambiguous
federal approval. Structure effectively defangs the specter of plenary federal
power. It also legitimizes tribal control over reservations.
CONCLUSION

The constitutional order has shown significant respect for consent of the
Indian nations as a just basis for their participation in American society. In
particular, the principle of consent justifies judicial rules that protect against
easy invasion of tribal rights. Yet departures from the consent principle
remain significant; the ultimate power to impose unconsented rules on tribes
has been exercised often enough to undermine claims to have justly achieved
Indian consent on any lasting and permanent basis. The oppressive conditions of some tribal societies constantly remind us that the status quo is unacceptable. The challenge to achieve a better future is as pressing now as it
has ever been.
In response to this challenge, many thinkers pursue visions of greater
tribal independence. However, attempting to realize these visions under the
Constitution's theories of individual rights guarded by the judiciary is not a
promising path. Throughout the nation's history, opponents of Indians have
made claims of individual constitutional rights and of states' tenth amendment rights to try to defeat Indian interests. While it is tempting to try to
fight fire with fire by erecting a tribal "tenth amendment" right, structural
constitutional protections are more appropriate to the status of tribes as
groups and governments. These protections require vigilance and effort,
152. See supra note 63 (federal regulation of gambling in Indian country); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc.
v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981)
(sustaining non-Indian corporation's cause of action for damages against tribes). The Dry Creek
Lodge decision was a very doubtful interpretation of existing law, see F. COHEN, supra note 3, at 668
n.52, but it illustrates the potential power of Congress.
153. See Merrion, 455 U.S. 130.
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which could be dangerously relaxed if tribes came to rely on the judicial
paternalism of rights-based status. Much more tribal independence can be
achieved within the existing system, by doing the hard work of building up
tribal governments and improving tribal economies.
Other visions go beyond the existing constitutional order and seek a
more securely independent status for tribes under international law or under
formal amendments to the Constitution.1 5 4 This quest should continue to
have the attention of contemporary political philosophy. It too takes the
constitutional value of consent of the governed as a fundamental premise.

154. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.

